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2I.  INTRODUCTION
This paper reports on the second year of compliance with the sulfur dioxide
(SO2) emissions-reduction and -trading provisions of Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments (CAAA). The material is intended as a supplement to Ellerman, et al.
(1997), which evaluated the
 
emissions-trading program in 1995, and to which the
reader is referred for background and definitions of terms. In the main, compliance with
Title IV in 1996 was very similar to that which occurred in 1995.  Sulfur dioxide
emissions from affected units were about 4.0 million tons lower than they would have
been in the absence of the emissions restrictions specified in Title IV.  As in 1995,
about half of the emissions reduction could be attributed to the use of scrubbers and
the other half to switching.  Finally, at 5.43 million tons, 1996 emissions from these
units were significantly below the 1996 "cap" of 8.12 million tons, not to mention the
3.25 million allowances banked from 1995 that could have been used in 1996.
However, the more interesting aspect of compliance with Title IV in 1996 lies not so
much in the aggregate results as in the small changes on the margin that indicate how
affected parties were using the flexibility afforded by emissions trading.  In this regard,
the most significant change was a 6% increase in emissions from affected units.  With
the decreasing number of allowances issued annually as Phase II approaches and a
fixed Phase II "cap," one would have expected emissions to be lower in 1996 than in
1995, not higher. The unexpected increase in average emission rates is, however, the
mirror image of the equally unexpected fall in the price of allowances between 1994
and 1995.  With lower allowance prices, it is cheaper in at least some locations to
spend more on allowances in order to take advantage of lower-priced, higher-sulfur
coal.
II. AGGREGATE COMPLIANCE DATA FOR 1995 AND 1996
A.  All Affected Units
The summary compliance statistics for the first two years of Title IV are
presented in Table 1 for both mandatorily (Table A) and voluntarily (substitution,
compensation, and opt-in industrial) affected units subject to emissions limits in Phase
3I. In comparing 1996 with 1995, the key points are:
4Table 1.  Summary: Title IV Compliance Data
1995 DATA Table A Voluntary Total
   Number of units 263 182 445
   Generating capacity (GWe) 88.0 41.6 129.6
   1985–87 baseline emissionsa (1012 Btu) 9,257 1,389 10,646
   Counterfactual emissionsb (103) 8,171 1,066 9,237
   Actual emissions (103) 4,445 853 5,298
   Allowances issued (103) 7,215 1,329 8,544
   Allowances banked(103) 2,770 476 3,246
   Title IV emission reductionc (103) 3,726 213 3,939
1996 DATA Table A Voluntary Total
   Number of units 263 168 431
   Generating capacity (GWe) 88.0 37.2 125.2
   1985–87 baseline emissionsa (1012 Btu) 9,257 1,261 10,518
   Counterfactual emissionsb (103) 8,606 869 9,475
   Actual emissions (103) 4,759 674 5,433
   Allowances (103) 6,888 1,234 8,122
   Banked allowances (103) 2,129 560 2,689
   Title IV emission reductionc (103) 3,847 195 4,042
Notes:
 a. Sum of baseline heat input (average 1985–87) times 1985 emission rate for all affected units.
b. Sum of 1993 emission rate times heat input during the year for all affected units.
c. Counterfactual emissions less actual emissions.
5•  Fewer units and generating capacity were affected.
•  Fewer allowances were issued.
•  Emissions from affected units increased by 135,000 tons.
•  The number of allowances banked decreased by 557,000.
•  The emissions reduction attributable to Title IV remained at about 4.0 million tons
annually.
Electric utility operators can decide from year to year whether non-Table A units
will become or remain affected units under Phase I.2 In 1996, the number of units and
generating capacity affected by Title IV decreased—the number of voluntarily affected
units by 14, due to the departure of 26 substitution units and six compensation units
and the accession of 11 substitution units and seven industrial opt-in units.
Sulfur dioxide emissions increased by 135,000 tons in 1996 because of two
compensating factors.  Table A units increased emissions by 314,000 tons due to
greater heat input and a slightly higher average emission rate; however, emissions from
the smaller number of voluntarily affected units were 179,000 tons less than in 1995.
The principal reason for the issuance of fewer allowances in 1996 was the
discontinuation of approximately 314,000 early reduction credits issued to five Table A
units for 1995 only.  The smaller number of voluntarily affected units also accounted for
a net reduction of 117,000 allowances.  In addition, there were minor adjustments in
the number of Phase I extension and substitution/compensation allowances issued to
units affected in both years.
As in 1995, 1996 emissions were well below the total number of allowances
issued for the year, but the amount banked by individual units in 1996 was 557,000, or
almost 20% less than in 1995. At the end of 1996, the total bank of allowances from
1995 and 1996, including the 150,000 allowances sold at auction for each vintage,
amounted to approximately 6.24 million allowances.
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   Title IV of the 1990 CAAA lists in Table A the 263 units that are mandated to become subject to Title IV
restrictions in Phase I, beginning in 1995.  The legislation also provides that 1) other utility units not
subject to Title IV until Phase II can, beginning in the year 2000, elect to become affected units in Phase I
as substitution or compensation units, and 2) industrial process units not otherwise affected may similarly
opt-in during Phase I or II.
6Despite the increase in emissions, we estimate that emissions reductions
attributable to Title IV remained about the same in 1996 as in 1995—at about 4 million
tons—because counterfactual emissions (what we estimate emissions would have
been without Title IV) increased by 238,000 tons due to greater generation of electricity
at Table A units.  This increase is approximately 100,000 tons more than the actual
increase in emissions at affected units; hence, the slight increase in the estimated
reduction attributable to Title IV, from 3.94 million tons to 4.04 million tons.  It must be
emphasized, however, that the figure for counterfactual emissions is only an estimate
based upon assumptions about the demand for electricity and unit emission rates in the
absence of Title IV. As in 1995, Table A units accounted for almost all Title IV
emissions reductions.
B.  Units Entering and Exiting the Title IV Program
The changing composition of units between 1995 and 1996 complicates the
analysis of compliance behavior unless the analysis is restricted to the units that were
subject to Phase I restrictions in both years.  Table 2 provides more detail about the
voluntarily affected units in 1995 and 1996 by category and isolates the 150 voluntarily
affected units that were subject to Title IV in both years.
Taken as a whole, the 32 substitution/compensation units exiting the program in
1996 had 1995 emissions 15,000 tons higher in the aggregate than the number of
allowances issued to them, while the 18 new voluntarily affected units banked a total of
32,000 allowances in 1996.  At the unit level, 16 of the 32 exiting units were short of
allowances in 1995, and they had to acquire additional allowances by transfer from
other units or by purchase.  In contrast, only two of the 18 newly volunteering units
were short of allowances in 1996.
Since voluntarily affected units can exit or enter voluntarily by declaration made
one month before the close of the calendar year, it would be unusual for a unit that had
such an option to be caught short, and in fact most are not. Still, unexpected changes
in the dispatch of units in the last month of the year can lead to the observed result.  In
addition, as noted by Montero (1997) in an earlier study of voluntary compliance in
71995, the reasons for volunteering are several and complex.  In this regard, it is worth
noting that not all of the units that were short of allowances in 1995 exited the program
in 1996, although the majority of them did. Eleven units that were short of allowances in
1995 stayed, and 9 of these units were also short of allowances in 1996.  In addition,
another 8 voluntarily affected units that had banked allowances in 1995 increased
emissions in 1996 such that they were short of allowances in 1996.  Nevertheless, the
total number of such units decreased from 27 in 1995 to 18 in 1996.
In addition to the electric utility generating units that can qualify as substitution
or compensation units, there were seven units at two industrial plants, in Tennessee
and in Indiana, that opted into the program in 1996.  (There were no such units in
1995.)  As discussed in more detail by Atkeson (1997), the plant in Tennessee was
shut down when an arrangement was made to obtain substitute steam from four
generating units operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority.  The three units at the
plant in Indiana provide electricity for an aluminum smelter and are co-located with a
fourth unit that provides electricity to the grid and is a Table A unit.
8Table 2.  Voluntarily Affected Units, 1995 & 1996
1995 1996
TOTAL UNITS EACH YEAR
   Affected units 182 168
   Generating capacity (GWe) 41.6 37.2a
   1985-87 Baseline emissions (1012 Btu) 1,389 1,261b
   Actual emissions  (103 tons) 853 674
   Allowances issued (103) 1,329 1,234
   Allowances banked (103) 476 560
EXITING/ENTERING UNITSc
   Affected units 32 11
   Generating capacity (GWe) 9.1 4.7
   1985–87 Baseline emissions  (1012 Btu) 273 97
   Actual emissions  (103 tons) 276 63
   Allowances issued (103) 261 95
   Allowances banked(103) –15 32
INDUSTRIAL OPT-IN UNITS
   Number of units 0 7
   Actual emissions  (103 tons) NA 37
   Allowances issued (103) NA 49
   Allowances banked (103) NA 12
UNITS AFFECTED BOTH YEARS
   Affected units 150 150
   Generating capacity (GWe) 32.5 32.5
   1985–87 Baseline emissions  (1012 Btu) 1,116 1,116
   Actual emissions  (103 tons) 578 574
   Allowances issued (103) 1,068 1,090
   Allowances banked (103) 490 516
Notes: aDoes not include industrial opt-in units.
bBaseline emissions for industrial opt-in units assumed equal to allowances.
c1995 and 1996 columns show data for units affected in those years only.
9C.  Units Affected in Both 1995 and 1996
The 150 continuing substitution and compensation units added to the 263 units
listed in Table A yield 413 units "commonly affected" in both 1995 and 1996.  These
units account for the great bulk of allowances, emissions, banking and the reduction
attributable to Title IV in both years.  Accordingly, unless explicitly noted to the contrary,
subsequent analysis is based on these units.  The summary statistics for these 413
commonly affected units are presented in Table 3.  In the main, the same conclusions
hold for this smaller set as for the comparison made in Table 1: fewer allowances, more
emissions, less banking, and a roughly constant reduction of emissions attributable to
Title IV in 1996 compared to 1995.  Table 3 clearly shows that most changes observed
between 1995 and 1996 are due to the Table A units, which account for approximately
70% of the affected capacity and 85% of allowances and emissions. Both heat input
and the average emission rate increased at Table A units in 1996, while the 150
continuing substitution and compensation units experienced little change in either.
The total number of Table A units retrofitted with scrubbers was brought to 27
by the addition of 6 more units that became operational in 1996. These units were
Conemaugh 2, located in Pennsylvania, Petersburg 1 & 2 in Indiana, HMP&L Station
Units 1 & 2 in Kentucky, and Niles 1 in Ohio.  Emissions from these six units were
127,000 tons less than in 1995 and offset slightly over a third of the increase in
emissions from the other Table A units.  As was the case with the 21 units retrofitted
with scrubbers in 1995, the utilization of these newly retrofitted units increased
markedly, by more than 20% over the average for the preceding six years.  The
reasons for this marked shift of generation to newly retrofitted units is not entirely clear,
but it has negated what might have been expected to be a tendency to shift generation
away from the newly-constrained Phase I affected units to units that were not yet
subject to Title IV limitations.
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Table 3.  Data on Units Affected in Both 1995 and 1996
Table A Units  (263) 1995 1996  Change % Change
   Heat input (1012 Btu) 4,708 4,897 + 189 +  4.0%
   Emission rate (# SO2/mmBtu) 1.89 1.94 + 0.05 +  2.6%
   Counterfactual emissions (103 tons) 8,171 8,606 + 435 +  5.3%
   Actual emissions (103 tons) 4,445 4,759 + 314 +  7.1%
   Allowances issued (103) 7,215 6,888 – 327 –  4.5%
   Allowances banked (103) 2,770 2,129 – 641 –
23.1%
   Title IV emission reduction (103 tons) 3,726 3,847 + 121 +  3.2%
Substitution/Compensation Units
(150)
1995 1996 Change % Change
   Heat input (1012 Btu) 1,377 1,366 – 11 –  0.8%
   Emission rate (# SO2/mmBtu) 0.84 0.84 0 0
   Counterfactual emissions (103 tons) 762 751 – 11 –  1.4%
   Actual emissions (103 tons) 578 574 –  4 –  0.7%
   Allowances issued (103) 1,068 1,090 + 22 +  2.1%
   Allowances banked (103) 490 516 + 26 +  5.3%
   Title IV emission reduction (103 tons) 184 177 –  7 –  3.8%
Total Units Affected Both Years (413) 1995 1996 Change % Change
   Heat input (1012 Btu) 6,085 6,263 + 178 +  2.9%
   Emission rate (# SO2/mmBtu) 1.65 1.70 + 0.05 +  3.0%
   Counterfactual emissions (103 tons) 8,933 9,357 + 424 +  4.7%
   Actual emissions (103 tons) 5,023 5,333 + 310 +  6.2%
   Allowances issued (103) 8,283 7,978 – 305 –  3.7%
   Allowances banked (103) 3,260 2,645 – 615 – 18.9%
   Title IV emission reduction (103 tons) 3,910 4,024 + 114 +  2.9%
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III.  ANALYSIS OF CHANGES OBSERVED IN 1996
A.  Changes in Emissions by Generating Units
Emissions are the product of the heat input of fuel used at each generating unit
and the SO2 emission rate associated with the fuel, as modified by whatever sulfur-
removal equipment may exist at the unit.  Accordingly, changes in emissions from one
year to another can be analyzed in terms of changes in heat input and in the emission
rate.  Since heat input for each unit is largely determined by the unit's position in
dispatch and the overall demand for electricity, the variable over which an operator has
most control for purposes of compliance with Title IV is emission rate. We therefore
focus most of our unit-level analysis on changes in emission rates between 1995 and
1996.
The operators of most commonly affected units kept the 1996 emission rate
very close to the 1995 rate; however, of those that did not, about twice as many
increased the emission rate as reduced it.  The top panel of Table 4 provides detail on
the number of units, capacity, 1996 heat input, emissions, and allowances for the 413
commonly affected units, categorized according to whether their 1996 emission rate (1)
increased more than 10%, (2) remained within +/–10%, or (3) decreased by more than
10% of the 1995 rate.  Table 4 also shows, in the second panel, the decomposition of
the change in emissions as a result of changes in heat input and emission rate.  The
109 units whose emission rates increased significantly are almost entirely offset by the
68 units that decreased emissions significantly.  As a result, the 310,000-ton aggregate
increase in emissions in 1996 over 1995 can be almost entirely attributed to increased
heat input, which is approximately evenly spread across units in the three categories.
Although the units’ increasing and reducing emission rates almost completely
offset each other, the question remains why nearly a quarter of the affected units would
be increasing emission rates significantly.  Furthermore, most of the offsetting reduction
results from the implementation of decisions made prior to 1995-96.  For instance, the
six units that retrofitted scrubbers in 1996 account for 148,000 tons, or slightly less than
half, of the 326,000 tons attributable to emission rate reductions at the 68 units.
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Table 4.  Commonly Affected Units
by Change in Emission Rate from 1995 to 1996
Decreasing No Change Increasing Total
No. Of Units 68 236 109 413
Capacity (GWe) 18.67 64.46 37.36 120.49
1996 Heat input (1012 Btu) 1,024 3,457 1,783 6,264
1995 Heat input (1012 Btu) 999 3396 1690 6,085
1996 Emission rate (#/mmBtu) 1.22 1.90 1.60 1.70
1995 Emission rate (#/mmBtu) 1.82 1.85 1.16 1.65
1996 Emissions (103 tons) 622 3,284 1,427 5,333
1995 Emissions (103 tons) 909 3138 976 5,023
ATTRIBUTION OF CHANGE IN EMISSIONS
Change in emissions –287 + 146 + 451 + 310
Due to heat input change +   39 + 147 + 107 + 293
Due to emission rate change –326 –    1 + 344 +   17
Notes:
 Decreasing is defined as a 1996 emission rate more than 10% below the 1995 rate.  No
change is an emission rate within +/–10% of the 1995 emission rate.  Increasing is a 1996
emission rate greater than 10% above the 1995 emission rate.
Contracts for the construction of these scrubbers were almost certainly signed before
1995.  Another 12 of these units, located in the area being heavily penetrated by PRB
and western coals, account for an additional 78,000 tons, or another 20% of this total.3
These switches would likely have occurred anyway, and their timing in 1996 may reflect
expiration of pre-Phase I contracts that required the use of higher sulfur coals in 1995.
When allowance is made for these units, only 50 units reduced emission rates for an
aggregate reduction in emissions of about 100,000 tons. In contrast, 109 affected units
increased emission rates by more than 10% and emissions by 344,000 tons.  These
actions increased the allowance costs incurred by the operator.
We turn now to the question of why some operators might increase allowance cost and
use up allowances in 1996, rather than save them for Phase II when more stringent
emission limits will be imposed.
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  These 12 units are located in Iowa, Missouri, Illinois, and western Tennessee.
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B.  The Price of Allowances
The most salient feature about the evolution of allowance prices to date is their
steady decline from early 1994 to early 1996.  In calendar year 1994, the average price
of an allowance was $159 and by 1995, the annual average price fell to an average of
$129.  As Figure 1 shows, allowance prices fell precipitously in the latter half of 1995;
by March 1996, the all-time low of $70 was recorded.4  Thereafter, prices rose steadily
throughout 1996, but the average annual price for the year was $84, well below the
1995 (not to mention the pre-Phase I) price.
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  This is the Emissions Exchange quote for March 1996.  The EPA auction that same month cleared at a
price of $66.05.
Figure 1:  Allowance Prices, 1994-97
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The price of an allowance indicates to all operators the value of an additional
ton of emission reduction.  Operators of affected units who are attentive to the market
price of allowances will compare this value to the incremental cost of burning a lower-
sulfur coal.  When the difference between the prices of  lower- and higher-sulfur coals
is greater than what is justified by the current price of allowances, such operators will
save money by purchasing the higher-sulfur coal and using more allowances.
Unfortunately, there is no good indicator of coal-sulfur premiums applicable in all
locations and to which movements in allowance prices can be compared.  This is
because the coals competing at most powerplants typically come from different
locations, so the difference in price between coals of varying sulfur content is as much
an issue of transportation and mine cost as it is the sulfur premium that might be
defined in some single mining district, such as Central Appalachia.  Nevertheless, it is
likely that the higher allowance prices in 1994 and 1995, not to mention expectations
that allowance prices would rise with the start of Phase I, caused operators to contract
for lower-sulfur coals in 1994 and 1995.  Depending on the length of the contract, those
purchases would be delivered over periods ranging from three months to several years,
and at least some of those contracts would be expiring in 1996.  With lower allowance
prices and the same coal-sulfur premium, some operators would be able to reduce
generating cost by shifting back to higher-sulfur coals.  More would be spent, or
foregone, on allowances, but the extra expense would be more than compensated by
the reduced fuel cost.
The higher-sulfur coals purchased by operators of the 109 units increasing
emission rates in 1996 were not necessarily what would be considered “high-sulfur”
coals, as shown by Table 5. Whether judged by percentage or absolute change, most
units whose emission rates increased in 1996 switched from low- to mid-sulfur coal, or
increased rates within the mid-sulfur ranges.  Only about 15 of the units switched either
from mid-sulfur to high-sulfur ranges or to even higher-sulfur coals within the high-sulfur
ranges. This shift to slightly higher sulfur content among the low- and mid-sulfur coals
indicates that higher sulfur content is penalized across the entire sulfur range of coal,
not just for some high-sulfur coals, and that at least some operators of affected units
are arbitraging between allowance and coal markets.
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Table 5.  Coal Switching by Units That Increased
 Emission Rate from 1995 to 1996
1996 Emission Rate (lbs/mmBtu)
< 1.5 1.5–2.5 2.5–3.5 3.5–5.0 > 5.0 TOTAL
< 1.5 48/4 17/9 1/1 66/14
1995 1.5–2.5 15/5 13/13 28/18
Emission 2.5–3.5 1/0 5/5 6/5
rate 3.5–5.0 3/3 5/5 8/8
(lbs/mmBtu) > 5.0 1/1 1/1
TOTAL 48/4 32/14 15/14 8/8 6/6 109/46
Notes:
  • The categorization of units used here reflects roughly what would be considered to be
low-, low-to-mid, mid-to-high, high-, and very-high-sulfur coal.
• The number preceding the slash mark in each cell entry indicates the number of units
that increased the emission rate by more than 10%, corresponding to the categories
used in Table 4.  Since many of these units are in the low-sulfur categories and a 10%
increase could be small, the number that increased the emission rate by more than
0.40#/mmBtu is indicated after the slash mark.
C.  Emissions Trading at the Unit and Utility Level
As in 1995, utilities made significant use of emissions trading to avoid high-cost
abatement at some units currently and in the future through banking.  Table 6 presents
the data on all affected units that were bankers and acquirers of allowances in 1995
and 1996.5 The number of units banking declined, as did the total allowances banked
and the average number of allowances banked per unit, while the number of units
acquiring allowances from other units to cover emissions in excess of unit allowance
allocations increased, as did the total number of such allowances and the average
number of allowances purchased per unit. The reduction in banking and increased use
of allowances to cover "excess" emissions is particularly noticeable among the 413
commonly affected units.  As shown in Table 7, 25 of these units shifted from being
bankers in 1995 to acquirers of allowances in 1996.  At the utility level, as shown by
Table 8, a similar small change was observed in the number of independent utilities
and holding companies with affected units that were net bankers and acquirers of
allowances.
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  We adopt the term acquirers to denote those who acquire allowances from other units or the
accumulated bank to cover emissions in excess of the allowances allocated to their unit in 1996.
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Table 6.  Net Banking Positions in 1995 & 1996
1995 1996 Difference
Total affected units 445 431 –14
Total net banking (103) 3,246 2,688 –558
Number of units banking 346 318 –28
   Allowances banked (103) 3,780 3,377 –403
   Average per unit 10,949 10,619 –330
Number of units acquiring 98 109 +11
   Allowances acquired (103) 534 689 +155
   Average per unit 5,449 6,321 +872
Zero banking units1 1 4 +3
Note:
 
1These units (substitution units, Wood River 1 in both years, and Poston 1, 2, and 3 in
1996) neither received allowances nor had any emissions in the respective years.
Table 7.  Change of Banking Status by Units, 1995 to 1996
Bankers Acquirers Zero Total
1995 Status 346 98 1 445
Commonly affected units –28 +25 +3 0
Units exiting in 1996 –16 –16 0 –32
Units entering in 1996 +16 +2 0 +18
1996 Status 318 109 4 431
Table 8.  Banking Status by Utility
1995 1996
Utilities with affected units 57 56
Net acquirers of allowances 6 7
Net bankers of allowances 51 49
  Trading among units 21 20
  No trading among units 23 21
  Single affected unit 7 8
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Table 9 provides more detail on the nine utilities for which emissions from
affected units were higher in the aggregate than the number of allowances issued to
those units in 1995 and/or 1996.  Four of the six utilities having this status in 1995
remained so in 1996, while two became net bankers (one, Indianapolis Power & Light,
because of the retrofitting of two units with scrubbers).  Three other utilities changed
from being net bankers in 1995 to net acquirers in 1996.  In contrast to the four utilities
that were net acquirers in both 1995 and 1996, which could only have obtained the
necessary allowances from other utilities, the three utilities that became net acquirers in
1996 would have been able to draw from the amounts they banked in 1995.
Most of the change in the net banking position of units and utilities occurred in
19 of the 56 utilities that had affected units during both years.  Table 10 decomposes
the net change in banking position for all 413 units affected in both years, and
attributes the change to changes in emission rates, heat input, and allowance
allocation.6 Of the 56 utilities and 413 units, 37 utilities and 144 units experienced little
change in any of these variables.  The remaining 19 utilities and 269 units account for
virtually all of the 600,000-allowance decrease in banking in 1996.  About half of the
total reduction in banking was due to increased emissions; the other half was due to
reduced allowance allocations.  The 19 utilities are further subdivided into four
categories, according to the factor most responsible for their change in banking status.
The only group to experience a net increase in banking included three utilities that
retrofitted scrubbers in 1996. Two other utilities increased banking because of
increased allowance allocations, but for the remaining 14 utilities, higher heat input,
higher emission rates, and fewer allowances led to significantly less banking in 1996
than in 1995.
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  The decomposition into the constituent elements is accomplished by the following discrete
approximation:
dNTP r dH H dr dA= + −
− −
where dNTP is the observed annual difference in net trading position, dH is the observed annual difference
in heat input, dr is the observed annual difference in emission rate, dA is the observed annual difference in
allowance allocation, rbar is the simple average of the unit emission rates during the two years, and Hbar
is the simple average of the unit heat input during the two years.
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Table 9:  Utilities Engaging in Inter-Utility Trading in 1995 or 1996
Aggregate Utility Undercompliance Total Allowances % Under/OverComp
All Affected Units 1995 1996 Abs Chg Sum2Yrs 1995 1996 1995 1996
Total Interutility 147,770 168,617 20,847 316,387 459,082 675,589 32% 25%
1995 Utilities
Illinois Power 110,925 127,480 16,555 238,405     186,579 194,573 59% 66%
Indianapolis P&L 24,022 (24,837) (48,859) (815)     126,881 96,655 19% (26%)
Duquesne Lighting 4,720 1,841 (2,879) 6,561
38,139
38,139 12% 5%
Tampa Electric 4,647 9,414 4,767 14,061
86,485
86,485 5% 11%
Hoosier Energy REC 2,215 (5,077) (7,292) (2,862)
18,427
18,427 12% (28%)
Iowa PubSvc Co 1,241 1,211 (30) 2,452
2,571
2,571 48% 47%
TOTAL 1995 147,770 110,032 (37,738) 257,802 459,082 436,850 32% 25%
New 1996 Utilities
Baltimore G&E (9,317) 7,265 16,582 (2,052)
21,479
21,479 (43%) 34%
Centerior Energy Corp (25,359) 10,672 36,031 (14,687)     213,788 211,188 (12%) 5%
Cent Ill PubSvc Co (25,932) 10,734 36,666 (15,198)     121,154 121,154 (21%) 9%
TOTAL 1996 (60,608) 28,671 89,279 (31,937) 356,421 353,821 (17%) 8%
TABLE 10:  CHANGE IN NET BANKING POSITION BY UTILITY
413 Unit Universe Net Banking Position Change Due to... Percent
Units 1995 1996 Change Heat Input Emis Rate Allow Alloc Heat Rate Allow
All Utilities 413 3,260,154 2,644,778 (615,376) (293,294) (16,904) (305,178) 48% 3% (50%)
37 Utilities with Little Change 144 1,113,137 1,096,371 (16,766) (2,979) (10,885) (2,902) 18% 65% (17%)
19 Utilities w/Big Changes 269 2,147,017 1,548,407 (598,610) (290,315) (6,019) (302,276) 48% 1% (50%)
Due to Emission Rate 87 707,577 386,326 (321,251) (87,711) (209,266) (24,274) 27% 65% (8%)
AEP 35 455,088 256,214 (198,874) (63,374) (123,519) (11,981) 32% 62% (6%)
Baltimore G&E 2 9,317 (7,265) (16,582) (3,027) (13,555) 0 18% 82% 0%
So Indiana G&E 3 12,652 (7,546) (20,198) (1,665) (18,533) 0 8% 92% 0%
Springfield, City of (Mo) 4 13,366 463 (12,903) (1,784) (11,119) 0 14% 86% 0%
Cinergy 22 91,216 45,317 (45,899) (3,690) (29,926) (12,283) 8% 65% (27%)
Ohio Edison 21 125,938 99,143 (26,795) (14,171) (12,614) (10) 53% 47% (0%)
3 Utilities w/96 Scrubbers 22 116,187 233,315 117,128 (26,746) 144,507 (633) (23%) 123% 1%
Big Rivers Electric 7 28,951 39,859 10,908 (5,287) 15,612 583 (48%) 143% (5%)
GPUC 8 98,031 168,619 70,588 (5,637) 77,441 (1,216) (8%) 110% 2%
Indianapolis P&L 7 (10,795) 24,837 35,632 (15,822) 51,454 0 (44%) 144% 0%
Due to Higher Heat Input 138 926,393 781,739 (144,654) (168,527) 26,890 (3,017) 117% (19%) (2%)
Centerior Elec Corp 25 25,359 (10,672) (36,031) (31,432) (1,999) (2,600) 87% 6% (7%)
Cent Ill PS Co 15 25,932 (10,734) (36,666) (33,631) (3,035) 0 92% 8% 0%
Consumers Power 4 31,630 20,103 (11,527) (11,247) (281) 0 98% 2% 0%
Southern Company 48 544,793 514,363 (30,430) (27,805) (2,208) (417) 91% 7% (1%)
Illinois Power 15 (111,627) (129,698) (18,071) (24,901) 6,830 0 138% (38%) 0%
Kentucky Utilities 5 86,959 77,235 (9,724) (12,088) 2,364 0 124% (24%) 0%
TVA 26 323,347 321,142 (2,205) (27,423) 25,219 0 1244% (1144%) 0%
Due to Allowance Changes 22 396,860 147,027 (249,833) (7,331) 31,850 (274,352) 3% (13%) (110%)
PacifiCorp 4 18,179 50,200 32,021 1,285 (160) 30,896 4% (0%) (96%)
Potomac Electric 6 33,062 40,047 6,985 (3,335) 1,320 9,000 (48%) 19% (129%)
Union Electric 12 345,619 56,780 (288,839) (5,281) 30,690 (314,248) 2% (11%) (109%)
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IV.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
There are two ways to view compliance with Title IV in 1996 as compared with
1995.  From one point of view, 1996 was very similar to 1995.  There were small
changes in coverage, emissions, and allowances, but the important aspects remained
unchanged:  a significant reduction of emissions below what would otherwise be the
case, mainly from Table A units, and significant banking of allowances.
From another point of view, 1996 can be seen as unusual in that the average
emission rate of affected units might have been expected to decline as Phase II
approached.  The unexpected increase in average emission rates is, however, the
mirror image of the equally unexpected fall in the price of allowances between 1994
and 1995.  With lower allowance prices, it is cheaper in at least some locations to
spend more on allowances in order to take advantage of lower-priced, higher-sulfur
coal.
The more fundamental issue is why allowance prices fell so precipitously in late
1995 and early 1996. As explained more fully in our more comprehensive analysis of
compliance in 1995, the cause was a combination of the recognition that current and
future costs would be lower than expected and the very low variable cost of abatement
by scrubbers, which established the floor.  For a variety of reasons, Phase I has been
characterized by overinvestment in compliance, and the response is a lower allowance
price trajectory, as well as a deferral of the time when higher-cost, Phase II abatement
will be required.  As such, the increase in emission rates in 1996 is a transitory
phenomenon that reflects an adjustment to the overinvestment in compliance that has
characterized Phase I, rather than movement along an equilibrium path.
Since early 1996, allowance prices have been on an upward trend.  In part, this
reflects the greater demand for allowances that appeared as utilities shifted to higher-
sulfur coals, but it is also more like the movement along the longterm trajectory that can
be expected to characterize allowance prices as Phase II approaches.  In this light,
1996 can be seen as a year of adjustment and of transition to a more realistic view of
current and future abatement costs.
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